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HIS Article discusses judicial developments relating to the Texas
law of intestacy, wills, estate administration, trusts, and other es-
tate planning matters during the Survey period of October 1, 2005
through September 30, 2006. The reader is warned that not all cases de-
cided during the Survey period are presented, nor does this Article ana-
lyze all aspects of each cited case. Each case must be read and studied
before relying on it or using it as precedent. The discussion of most cases
includes an important lesson to be learned from the case. By recognizing
situations that have resulted in time-consuming and costly litigation in the
past, the reader may be able to reduce the likelihood of the same situa-
tions arising with his or her clients.
I. WILLS
A. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
Long v. Long1 demonstrates that a will contestant will have a difficult
time overturning a trial court's finding that a testator had the testamen-
tary capacity to execute a will. The testator's will was contested on the
grounds that he lacked testamentary capacity when he executed his will.
The Dallas Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence to
support the trial court's finding that he indeed had testamentary capac-
ity. 2 The court of appeals reviewed the evidence, which showed that,
even though the testator was undergoing cancer treatment, he was aware
of what he was doing, knew the extent of his property, identified his fam-
ily members, and recognized how he wanted his property distributed. In
fact, he drafted the will himself on his computer.
1. 196 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).




Texas courts view claims of contractual wills cautiously, thus the re-
quirements for a valid contractual will are strictly construed.3 For exam-
ple, in In re Estate of Friesenhahn,4 a husband and his wife executed wills
on the same day. After the husband died, his will was admitted to pro-
bate. A dispute arose between his wife and the husband's children from a
prior marriage. The wife claimed that the husband's will devised certain
land to her in fee simple, while the children asserted that the wills were
contractual. The trial court granted summary judgment holding that the
wills were contractual.5
The San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed. 6 The court of appeals
recognized that the husband's will stated that it was "executed in accor-
dance with a contract between" the spouses.7 However, the gift of land
to the wife was devised to her without any restrictions and thus was an
absolute and unconditional gift in fee simple. Thus, the requirement that
property subject to a contractual will must not be conveyed to the survi-
vor as an absolute and unconditional gift was not satisfied. 8 Likewise, the
other requirement of a contractual will, that it treat the estates of both
parties as a single estate following the survivor's death, which is jointly
disposed of by both testators in the contingent dispositive provisions of
the will, was not satisfied.9 Instead, the husband's will merely provided
alternative beneficiaries when it provided to whom the property would
pass if his wife predeceased him. 10
C. CONDITIONAL GIFT
Mangrum v. Conrad" reminds will drafters that conditions on testa-
mentary gifts must be carefully stated to have the desired effect. In Man-
grum, the husband died and was survived by his wife and children from a
prior marriage. The husband's will provided a significant gift to his wife
that was conditioned on her waiving her homestead rights and any other
rights that she might have as a surviving spouse. If she failed to waive
these rights, the husband gave this property to his children instead. A
dispute arose regarding whether the wife had waived her rights because
she lived in the home for several years after her husband's death. The
trial court granted the wife's request for a summary judgment that she
had not waived her right to claim under the will by remaining in the
home, and the Dallas Court of Appeals agreed. 12
3. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59A (Vernon 2003).
4. 185 S.W.3d 16 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied).
5. Id. at 18.
6. Id. at 21.




11. 185 S.W.3d 602 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied).
12. Id. at 603.
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The court of appeals recognized that the wife remained in the home for
many years, changed the utilities into her name, planted flowers, and did
other things inconsistent with a waiver of her right to the home. 13 How-
ever, the husband's will conditioned his wife's gift on her expressly waiv-
ing her rights, which she did in a written document filed with the court.
There was also evidence that the wife had told others that she was elect-
ing to take under the will and waive any rights that she might have as a
surviving spouse. The court determined that the election was timely be-
cause the will did not specify a time, and the wife had arguably valid
reasons for remaining on the property after her husband died. 14 This evi-
dence was not controverted, thus the trial court's grant of a summary
judgment was proper. 15
D. TAX APPORTIONMENT
In Patrick v. Patrick,16 the testatrix's will provided that "[a]ll taxes...
which may be payable by reason of my death.., shall be charged against
and paid out of my estate."' 17 The named beneficiary on non-probate
IRAs claimed that the testatrix's estate was responsible for the estate
taxes triggered by inclusion of the IRAs in the taxable estate while the
will beneficiaries claimed that the apportionment rules of Probate Code
section 322A would apply. The Austin Court of Appeals held that the
apportionment rules applied, and the appellate court affirmed.' 8
The court of appeals rejected the IRA beneficiary's claim that the tes-
tatrix's will expressly provided otherwise, as authorized under Probate
Code section 322A(b)( 2). 19 The court determined that the testatrix's use
of the word "taxes" was not sufficiently specific and that she did not ex-
pressly provide for estate taxes to be paid without apportionment. 20 The
court also gave a broad interpretation to the term "estate" as not being
limited to the "probate estate" but instead encompassing the "total prop-
erty" that the testatrix owned when she died.2' The court also took note
of a will provision expressly exempting life insurance proceeds from ap-
portionment. This language would have been unnecessary if the testatrix
had intended all non-probate assets to be exempt from apportionment. 22
This case demonstrates that a testator who does not desire estate taxes
to be apportioned must clearly express that intent.23 Prudent practice
would be for the testator to state, "I direct that all taxes, including (but
13. Id. at 606.
14. Id. at 607.
15. Id.
16. 182 S.W.3d 433 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet.).
17. Id. at 435.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 437-38.
20. Id. at 437.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 438.
23. Compare id. at 437-38, with Peterson v. Mayse, 993 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. App.-
Tyler 1999, pet. denied) (holding on arguably similar facts that the will's language clearly
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not limited to) the federal estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes,
payable by reason of my death be charged against my estate regardless of
whether the asset subject to tax is or is not included in my probate estate.
I do not want these taxes apportioned under Texas Probate Code section
322A or any other statute or judicial decision that provides for tax
apportionment."
E. UNDUE INFLUENCE
Long v. Long24 serves as a reminder that a will contestant will have a
difficult time overturning a trial court's finding that a testator was not
subject to undue influence. The testator's will was contested on the
ground that his new wife exercised undue influence over him when he
executed his will. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that there was suffi-
cient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the testator was not
unduly influenced.25 The court of appeals rejected the contestants' asser-
tion that the testator's new wife was a "black widow" and was exploiting
the testator's medical condition (cancer treatment) to her advantage. 26
The evidence showed that the testator was not isolated from his family





The Texarkana Court of Appeals in Hailey v. Siglar2 7 made an urgent
plea when it stated, "We suggest that the Legislature look seriously at the
complicated and overlapping trial court jurisdictional requirements in this
state and enact reforms to make jurisdictional requirements uniform and
understandable. '2 8 In this case, a daughter transferred funds from her
father's account to her own account one month before her father signed a
durable power of attorney naming the daughter as his agent. After the
father's death, a statutory county court exercising probate jurisdiction ap-
pointed his son as the independent executor of his father's estate. Shortly
thereafter, the son filed suit in district court to recover the pre-power-of-
attorney transferred funds from the daughter. The son prevailed in this
action, and the daughter appealed. 29 .
The court of appeals vacated the district court's judgment and dis-
missed the case without prejudice explaining that the district court lacked
and unambiguously provided that death taxes should first be paid from the assets described
in the residuary clause of the testator's will).
24. 196 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
25. Id. at 467.
26. Id.
27. 194 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. denied).
28. Id. at 82.
29. Id. at 76.
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jurisdiction to hear the case. 30 The court rejected the son's arguments
that the district court had jurisdiction. The son asserted that the amount
in controversy exceeded the amount over which the statutory county
court would have jurisdiction. The court explained that the Texas Su-
preme Court had decided decades ago that "[t]he monetary limitations
on a statutory county court's jurisdiction in civil cases do not limit its
probate jurisdiction. '31
The court then discussed the application of Probate Code section 5.32
The county court at law had jurisdiction over the father's estate and all
matters incident to the estate. Probate Code section 5A(a) includes "all
claims by ... an estate" within the definition of incident to the estate as it
applies to county courts at law. 33 The son's attempt to recover funds
from the daughter was a claim by an estate, thus the county court at law
had jurisdiction.34
The court then examined former Probate Code section 5(a) (repealed
in 2003), which provided that the district court has "original control and
jurisdiction over executors ...under such regulations as may be pre-
scribed by law."' 35 The court conducted a detailed analysis of the Texas
Supreme Court case of Bailey v. Cherokee County Appraisal District
36
and lower court cases interpreting the opinion.37 The court recognized
the confusion over whether a county court at law has exclusive or merely
dominant jurisdiction in matters incident to an estate. The court held that
the "sounder reading" of the Bailey opinion is that "the county court at
law is vested with exclusive jurisdiction. '38
2. Statutory Probate Court
Schuchmann v. Schuchmann39 shows that appellate courts appear un-
willing to expand the jurisdiction of statutory probate courts to situations
that have a tenuous, if any, connection to probate or trust matters. While
divorce litigation was pending in a district court, a husband sued his wife
in a statutory probate court with regard to inter vivos trusts the husband's
father had created naming the husband as a beneficiary. This triggered a
variety.of orders and settlement agreements resulting in a convoluted set
of events that eventually led to the wife filing a motion in probate court
to enforce a settlement agreement and to transfer the husband's post-
divorce action to the probate court. Despite the husband's argument that
the probate court lacked jurisdiction, the probate court ordered the post-
30. Id. at 82.
31. Id. at 76 (citing English v. Cobb, 593 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. 1979)).
32. Id. at 77.
33. Id. at 78.
34. Id. at 80.
35. Id.
36. 862 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. 1993).
37. Id. at 978-80 (citing Bailey, 862 S.W.2d at 585-86).
38. Id. at 79.
39. 193 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).
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divorce action transferred from the district court.40 The husband
appealed.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the probate
court lacked jurisdiction to transfer the post-divorce action. 41 The court
of appeals explained that the post-divorce action dealt with assets unre-
lated to the trusts at issue in the probate court litigation. The court ex-
amined Probate Code section 5 and found no basis to give the probate
court jurisdiction.42 The suit did not involve (1) an inter vivos trust (sec-
tion 5(e)); (2) a matter appertaining or incident to the estate of a de-
ceased person (section 5(h)); or (3) a set of facts that would trigger the
probate court's pendant and ancillary jurisdiction, which exists when
there is a close relationship between non-probate claims and the matter
pending in the probate court so that the court's exercise of jurisdiction
would aid in the efficient administration of a matter pending in probate
court (section 5(i)).43 Accordingly, the court of appeals ordered the pro-
bate court to transfer the case back to the district court.44
3. Statutory Probate Court-Appointment of Receiver
In re Estate of Trevifio 45 serves as a reminder that a statutory probate
court has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver. Under a highly convoluted
set of facts and court orders, the attorney for the executrix obtained an
order from a statutory probate court for the appointment of a receiver to
protect his contingency-fee interest in a business constituting estate prop-
erty that he successfully recovered from a conflicting claimant. The exec-
utrix appealed.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed.46 The statutory probate
court has jurisdiction over matters appertaining or incident to an estate,
as well as pendant and ancillary jurisdiction necessary to promote judicial
efficiency and economy under Probate Code section 5.47 Accordingly,
the statutory probate court had jurisdiction to appoint a receiver.48
4. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
Dolenz v. Vail49 demonstrates that assertions of res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel do not negate a court's jurisdiction, although they may im-
pact the court's ultimate decision in the case. A creditor asserted that the
decedent had granted him a security interest under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code ("UCC") in paintings held by the decedent's trust as collat-
40. Id. at 600-01.
41. Id. at 605.
42. Id. at 603.
43. Id. at 602-03.
44. Id. at 605.
45. 195 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.).
46. Id. at 232.
47. Id. at 228.
48. Id. at 232.
49. 200 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
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eral for the payment of legal fees. The creditor sought to take possession
of the paintings, and the probate court denied the motion finding that it
had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the matters were decided in
prior proceedings, both at the trial and appellate levels. 5 °
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed.5 ' The court held that the pro-
bate court had jurisdiction to hear the creditor's motion because "his
claim is a matter relating to the distribution of [the] estate of a deceased
person and thus a matter 'incident to an estate"' under Probate Code
sections 5(d), 5(f), and 5A(b). 52 The court explained that collateral es-
toppel and res judicata are not jurisdictional issues, although they may
affect the merits of the creditor's claim. 53
B. TRANSFER
1. Conditional Filing
The case of In re Lewis 54 applies the concept of conditional filing to a
case dealing with the transfer of a probate action. The judge of a consti-
tutional county court in a county with no other court exercising probate
jurisdiction transferred the lawsuit to district court. The executrix
claimed that the transfer was improper and that a statutory probate court
judge should be assigned to hear the case because the executrix filed her
request first. Probate Code section 5(b-1) provides that once a party re-
quests the assignment of a statutory probate court judge, the county
judge may not transfer the case to district court.55 The other party admit-
ted that the executrix filed her request first, but she did not pay the filing
fee until after the transfer motion was filed and signed.
The Waco Court of Appeals agreed with the executrix and condition-
ally granted a writ of mandamus. 56 The court explained that although the
executrix did not pay the filing fee until after the judge signed the transfer
order, it was nonetheless "conditionally" filed first and thus had priority
because once the clerk received the filing fee, the executrix's motion was
deemed to have been properly filed before the transfer motion.57
A dissenting justice explained that the court of appeals should not have
granted mandamus, because when the county judge signed the transfer
order, the executrix had not paid the filing fee, thus the filing was not yet
effective. 58
50. Id. at 339-40.
51. Id. at 341.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 185 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
55. Id. at 617.
56. Id. at 618-19.
57. Id. at 617.




The case In re Estate of Alexander5 9 shows that a party who wishes to
seek a remedy in a probate matter that a constitutional or county court at
law may not grant should file an original action seeking that remedy in
the district court. The beneficiary filed suit to probate a nuncupative will
in a constitutional county court. The court then granted the beneficiary's
motion to transfer the case to district court even though the county had a
statutory county court with probate jurisdiction. The district court found
that the decedent died intestate, and the beneficiary appealed. 60
Although the beneficiary did not raise the issue, the Waco Court of
Appeals determined that the county court had no legal basis to transfer
the case to district court because the county had a statutory county court
at law with probate jurisdiction.61 Probate Code section 5 permits trans-
fer of a probate matter to district court only if the county has no statutory
court with probate jurisdiction. 62 Accordingly, "the transfer order is of
no effect and any subsequent orders rendered by the district court are
void.,"63
The a court recognized that if a probate court lacks authority to grant a
claimant full relief, the district court will have jurisdiction to grant these
remedies.64 The court noted that the beneficiary was seeking a construc-
tive trust remedy, which neither the constitutional county court nor
county court at law had jurisdiction to impose under Probate Code sec-
tion 5A. In these situations, however, a plaintiff should file suit directly
in an original action in the district court to seek these remedies. A dis-
senting justice argued that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction of the
case because of an allegedly untimely notice of appeal.65
C. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
A party appealing a lower court's probate order must make certain that
the order is appealable. If in doubt, the party wishing to appeal should
take some action such as seeking a severance order or asking the court
for a permissive interlocutory appeal. For example, in Ayala V. Mackie,6 6
a county court at law admitted a foreign will to probate and granted ancil-
lary letters of testamentary. The executrix then sued an heir, claiming
that she and other heirs wrongfully appropriated over $60 million in es-
tate assets. The heir moved to dismiss the executrix's action, asserting
that the county court at law had no subject-matter jurisdiction. The
county court at law denied the motion, and the heir appealed. 67 The
59. 188 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, no pet.).
60. Id. at 329.
61. Id. at 332.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 331.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 332-33 (Gray, J., dissenting).
66. 193 S.W.3d 575 (Tex. 2006).
67. Id. at 577.
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court of appeals began its analysis by holding that the county court at
law's order was final for the purposes of appeal, citing the landmark
Texas case of Crowson v. Wakeham.68
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with the executrix that the county
court's order was merely interlocutory, and hence unappealable, because
numerous pleadings and issues were still pending in the county court at
law.69 The Texas Supreme Court pointed out that the appealing parties
did not seek a severance order as it had urged in its Crowson opinion. 70
In addition, "[b]ecause an order denying a plea to the jurisdiction and
refusing to remove an executor does not end a phase of the proceedings,
but sets the stage for the resolution of all proceedings, the order is inter-
locutory. '71 The supreme court also rejected an argument that Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)( 2) permits an inter-
locutory appeal.72
D. POWERS OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR
A dispute over the powers that a temporary administrator may prop-
erly exercise formed the basis of the controversy in Hill v. Bartlette.73
The temporary administrator of the decedent's estate signed a settlement
agreement releasing a tortfeasor from all claims arising out of an accident
that caused the decedent's death. Several years later, the decedent's
mother sued the tortfeasor, asserting wrongful-death and survival claims.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the tortfeasor, and
the decedent's mother appealed. 74
The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed on two grounds. 75 First, the
court held that the statute of limitations had run and that there was insuf-
ficient evidence to prove that the tortfeasor was equitably estopped from
raising. the defense. 76 Second, and more importantly from a probate per-
spective, the court agreed that the settlement agreement operated as an
accord and satisfaction of both the wrongful-death and survival claims. 77
The mother made several unsuccessful arguments that the settlement
agreement was not binding.
* The mother claimed that the temporary administrator did not have
the authority to settle the wrongful-death claim because the claim
belonged to the statutory beneficiaries and did not benefit the es-
68. Ayala v. Brittingham, 131 S.W.3d 3, 6-7 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003) (citing
Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1995)), rev'd sub nom., Ayala v. Mackie, 193
S.W.3d 575 (Tex. 2006).
69. Ayala, 193 S.W.3d at 579-80.
70. Id. at 578-79.
71. Id. at 579.
72. Id. at 579-80.
73. 181 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.).
74. Id. at 544.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 550.
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tate. 78 However, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section
71.004(c) gives an administrator the authority to pursue wrongful-
death actions on behalf of the statutory beneficiaries if they do not
take action on their own within three months after a decedent's
death. 79
- The mother asserted that the temporary administrator lacked au-
thority to settle claims on behalf of the estate.80 The court quickly
dismissed this argument by pointing to Probate Code section 234(a)(
4), which gives the personal representative the power to make com-
promises and settlements. 81
* The order appointing the temporary administrator did not ex-
pressly grant authority to settle the survival and wrongful-death
claims. Thus, the mother claimed that the settlement agreement was
not binding under Probate Code section 133. The court rejected this
argument by quoting the order, which provided that the temporary
administrator had the authority to represent the estate and the heirs
"in all necessary respects regarding any and all claims ... against [the
tortfeasorl ... arising from [the accident that caused the decedent's
death]."82
- The mother claimed that the probate court lacked jurisdiction over
wrongful-death and survival claims. The court of appeals recognized
that the case law that the mother cited to support her claim was out-
of-date and that the Probate Code now gives probate courts such
jurisdiction.83
* The mother did not sign the settlement agreement and had not
received its proceeds. The court explained that the mother's signa-
ture was not necessary and that the proper distribution of the pro-
ceeds by the temporary administrator was not the tortfeasor's
responsibility. 84
A concurring opinion points out that, although the temporary adminis-
trator had the authority to represent the estate, Probate Code section
234(a)( 4) requires the personal representative to make a written applica-
tion to the court and obtain an order specifically authorizing the
settlement. 85
E. APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR
In re Estate of Stanton 86 makes it clear that if a personal representative
takes actions requiring court authorization without obtaining that author-
ization, such conduct is sufficient grounds for a court to determine that
the person is unsuitable to serve as a personal representative. After the




82. Id. at 550.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 550-51 (Carter, J., concurring).
86. 202 S.W.3d 205 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2005, pet. denied).
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temporary administrator's appointment expired under Probate Code sec-
tion 131A, he filed a request for payment of legal services that he per-
formed while serving as the temporary administrator. He also served as
the attorney for several parties asking for appointment as the permanent
administrator and sought to have himself reappointed as the temporary
administrator. The duly appointed attorney ad litem for the decedent's
unknown heirs under Probate Court section 34A opposed these applica-
tions and asked the court to appoint an independent party as the adminis-
trator.8 7 The probate court agreed, appointed a third party as the
administrator, and denied the temporary administrator's request for at-
torney's fees. The temporary administrator appealed.
The Tyler Court of Appeals rejected the temporary administrator's ar-
gument that the probate court abused its discretion in appointing a third
party as the administrator because the applicants had higher priority
under Probate Code section 77.88 The court of appeals explained that all
of the other applicants had demonstrated a history of exceeding their au-
thority in this case, thus the probate court could reasonably conclude that
they were unsuitable to serve.89 For example, the temporary administra-
tor filed an application to determine heirship without obtaining court per-
mission, and the other applicants continued to manage estate property
without court authorization even after the temporary administration had
ended.
F. WILL CONTEST
According to In re Estate of Blevins,90 a will may be contested within
two years of probate even if the contestant received notice of the original
probate. proceeding. The testator's will was admitted to probate as muni-
ment of title almost nine years after the testator's death. Nine months
later, several of the beneficiaries filed an application to set aside the pro-
bate. The trial court dismissed the application, agreeing with the will pro-
ponent that, because the contestants were personally served with citation
and did not appear to contest the order, they were barred by the doctrine
of res judicata.9I The contestants appealed.
The Tyler Court of Appeals reversed.92 The court looked at Probate
Code section 93, which provides that a contestant has two years from the
date that a will is admitted to probate to contest its validity.93 Because
the contestants filed the contest well within the two-year period (just nine
months), they were entitled to pursue the contest.94 The court explained
that there was no basis for the will proponent's argument that the two-
87. Id. at 208.
88. Id. at 208-09.
89. Id. at 209.
90. 202 S.W.3d 326 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2006, no pet.).
91. Id. at 327.
92. Id. at 329.
93. Id. at 328.
94. Id. at 329.
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year period does not apply to interested persons who were personally
served with a copy of the initial application to probate the will. 95
G. REMOVAL OF EXECUTOR
In re Estate of Clark96 reminds executors that they should timely obey
court orders or risk removal from office. The Dallas Court of Appeals
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing the exec-
utor from office. 97 The estate had been under dependent administration
for over two decades, and the executor had been in office since 2000. The
court reviewed the executor's conduct and determined that removal was
appropriate under Probate Code section 222(b)( 3) for failing to obey a
valid court order.98 The trial court had ordered the executor to sell the
estate's remaining assets, and almost three years later, the sales were not
completed. There was also evidence that the executor had overstated his
progress by claiming in court reports that purchase contracts existed
when in reality they did not.
H. LOST WILLS
Two cases decided during the Survey period took different approaches
as to how to prove the contents of a lost will.
1. Contents Not Proved
In Garton v. Rockett,99 the executor attempted to probate a copy of the
will. The copy appeared to comply with the requirements of a valid will
under Texas law. The key issue was whether the executor substantially
proved the contents of the will through the testimony of a credible wit-
ness who either read the will or heard the will read as required by the
lost-will procedure provided in Probate Code section 85. The jury deter-
mined that the executor had supplied sufficient evidence of the contents,
but the judge granted the heirs a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The appellate court affirmed. 100
The Houston Court of Appeals examined the evidence and concluded
that the executor "failed to offer any testimony concerning the contents
of the original will by a credible witness who read the will or heard it
read."10 1 Although the executor put on the testimony of a witness and
the notary, they admitted that they either did not read the original will or
could not recall its contents. Reading a copy of the will is not a substitute
for reading the original will.
95. Id. at 328.
96. 198 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied).
97. Id. at 273.
98. Id. at 275-76.
99. 190 S.W.3d 139 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
100. Id. at 149.




In the contrasting case In re Estate of Jones,102 the will proponent filed
a will for probate claiming that it was the testator's original will. After an
anonymous caller tipped off the clerk's office, it became apparent that
the will was not an original but a copy. Although the Beaumont Court of
Appeals later withdrew the will from probate and revoked letters on pro-
cedural grounds, the court eventually admitted the will to probate even
though there was no evidence as required by Probate Code section 85
that the contents of the will be proved by the testimony of a credible
witness who had read it or heard it read when the original is not produced
in court.10 3
The court affirmed after making the remarkable holding that Probate
Code section 85 was inapplicable.1 0 4 The court discussed a long line of
Texas cases, including Garton v. Rockett.10 5 Nonetheless, the court
stated:
We do not see the "read it or heard it read" requirement in section
85 as intending to determine the accuracy of a photocopy of a written
will .... The purpose of section 85, as we see it, is to establish the
contents of a written will not in the custody of the court and that can
only be reproduced by a written order of the probate court based on
testimony describing the will's contents .... If a writing is an accu-
rate reproduction of the valid unrevoked written will of the testator,
the probate court need not rely on or require the testimony of a
credible witness who testifies from memory regarding the provisions
of the testator's will, because the written terms of the will are before
the court. 10 6
Based on this analysis, the court concluded that section 85 does not apply
when a photocopy of a will is produced in court because the copy is a
written will produced in court. 10 7
This opinion is directly contrary to established Texas statutory and case
law. A photocopy of a will is not a will, just as a photocopy of a $100 bill
is not a $100 bill-passing a $100 bill to a cashier gets you $100 worth of
merchandise, while passing a photocopy gets you a federal prison term.
The court was obviously attempting to carry out the decedent's intent by
upholding the probate of the will. However, the protections of section 85
are there to prevent fraud by assuring that independent evidence of the
will's contents exists, but the original cannot be presented to the court for
examination. If the rules are to be changed, the Texas Legislature should
make the change, not the courts.
102. 197 S.W.3d 894 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, pet. filed).
103. Id. at 897.
104. Id. at 902.
105. Id. at 902-03 (citing Garton v. Rockett, 190 S.W.3d 139 (Tex. App.-Houston f1st
Dist.] 2005, no pet.)).





A receivership may be a useful technique to resolve complex or ex-
tended litigation involving estate property. For example, in In re Estate of
Trevifio,10 8 under a highly convoluted set of facts and court orders, the
attorney for the executrix obtained an order from a statutory probate
court for the appointment of a receiver to protect his contingency-fee in-
terest in a business constituting estate property that he successfully recov-
ered from a conflicting claimant. The executrix appealed.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed. 10 9 First, the appellate
court rejected the executrix's claim that the appointment of a receiver
usurped her authority and interfered with the estate's independent ad-
ministration.' 10 The court noted that the probate court had pendant and
ancillary jurisdiction even if those matters were not appertaining or inci-
dent to an estate under Probate Code section 5(i).111
Second, the court determined that the probate court did not abuse its
discretion by appointing a receiver. 112 The court engaged in a detailed
review of the facts, which showed that the appointment of a receiver was
justified as a means of resolving years of litigation regarding the
property. 1 13
J. SURVIVAL ACTION
Normally, survival actions are brought by the decedent's personal rep-
resentative. However, as discussed in Ferrer v. Guevara,1 14 an heir may
bring a survival action if (1) an administration of the decedent's estate is
not pending, and (2) no administration is necessary. 115 In Ferrer, a
daughter brought a survival action to recover medical expenses and other
damages incurred by her father before his death that allegedly stemmed
from a car accident. The defendant appealed, claiming that the daughter
lacked standing to bring the survival action.11 6
The El Paso Court of Appeals held that the daughter had standing for
two distinct reasons. 117 First, she received an assignment of all her fa-
ther's rights arising out of the car accident.1 18 Second, as her father's
heir, she had standing because she proved that no administration hearing
regarding her father's estate was pending and that an administration was
not necessary. 1 9
108. 195 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.).
109. Id. at 232.
110. Id. at 228-29.
111. Id. at 229.
112. Id. at 229-32.
113. Id. at 231-32.
114. 192 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, pet. granted).
115. Id. at 45.
116. Id. at 43.
117. Id. at 44.
118. Id. at 44-45.





Paul v. Merrill Lynch Trust Co. of Texas 12 0 reflects how difficult it is for
a beneficiary to overturn a probate court's denial of attorneys' fees on
appeal. The beneficiaries sued the executor asserting assorted breaches
of duty. The trial court denied the beneficiaries' request for attorneys'
fees under Probate Code section 245, and the Waco Court of Appeals
affirmed. 121 The court reviewed the probate court's findings that, al-
though the executor's conduct had sometimes deviated from the ordinary
standard of care, the executor's acts were not willful, malicious, or in bad
faith.122 Thus, the probate court's denial of attorneys' fees was not an
abuse of discretion.
2. To Executor
The Paul case also shows that a probate court's award of attorneys' fees
will be hard to overturn on appeal.123 The trial court awarded the execu-
tor attorneys' fees for its defense of a removal action brought by the ben-
eficiaries. The court of appeals found that the executor's defense was in
good faith, thus the executor was entitled to recover its attorneys' fees
from the decedent's estate under Probate Code section 149C(c). 124
3. By Unsuccessful Will Contestant
In re Estate of Arndt125 shows that when seeking attorneys' fees, a
party should present sufficient evidence to prove the amount of those
fees. Both the trial and court of appeals agreed that an unsuccessful will
contestant was not entitled to attorneys' fees under Probate Code section
243.126 Although the jury did determine that the will contestant acted in
good faith and with just cause, the amount of fees was not submitted.
Because the trial court did not award attorneys' fees, there is an implied
finding that the trial court found against the contestant on the issue of the
amount of fees under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 279.127 The court of
appeals explained that there was no evidence of the contestant's employ-
ment arrangement with her attorneys.128 For example, the parties may
have agreed to a contingency fee, and hence no fees would be owed be-
cause the contest action failed.129
120. 183 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, no pet.).
121. Id. at 810, 813.
122. Id. at 812-13.
123. See id. at 814.
124. Id. at 813.
125. 187 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2005, no pet.).
126. Id. at 86.
127. Id. at 90.
128. Id. at 91.
129. Id.
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4. Against Personal Representative Who Neglects Duty
The court may award attorneys' fees anytime a personal representative
fails to perform a required duty. For example, in In re Estate of Haw-
kins,1 30 the probate court determined that the administrator did not
timely distribute the intestate's estate to the heir and ordered the admin-
istrator to pay the heir's attorneys' fees under Probate Code section 245.
The administrator appealed.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed.13 1 The court rejected the
administrator's argument that section 245 authorizes an award of attor-
neys' fees only for an action seeking the removal of a personal represen-
tative.1 32 Instead, the court pointed out that the statute expressly permits
an award of attorneys' fees "[w]hen a personal representative neglects to
perform a required duty," which in this case was the failure to make a
timely distribution of estate property to the heir. 13 3 The court also re-
jected the administrator's argument that attorneys' fees may be awarded
only after the estate is closed.1 34 The court explained that costs and attor-
neys' fees may be awarded at any time.1 35
5. To Unsuccessful Will Proponent
Garton v. Rockett136 discusses how a named executor who attempts to
probate a will may recover reasonable attorneys' fees even if the attempt
fails as long as the executor acted in good faith and with just cause. The
named executor attempted to probate the will. The jury found that the
will was valid and that the executor filed the probate proceeding in good
faith and with just cause. The judge ignored these findings and granted a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Houston Court of Appeals
agreed with the trial judge that the evidence did not support the jury's
finding that the will was valid.1 37 However, the court agreed with the
executor that he filed the application in good faith and with just cause
and thus was entitled to a reasonable attorneys' fee under Probate Code
section 243.138 The court explained that the executor had presented suffi-
cient evidence to justify the jury's finding.1 39 The court also pointed out
that section 243 does not require that an executor be successful in probat-
ing the will to be entitled to a reasonable attorneys' fee.1 40
130. 187 S.W.3d 182 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).
131. Id. at 183.
132. Id. at 185.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 186.
135. Id.
136. 190 S.W.3d 139 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
137. Id. at 147.
138. Id. at 149.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 148.
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6. Beneficiary's Defense of Conduct
A beneficiary who defends herself against accusations of personal
wrongdoing relating to a testator's estate is unlikely to recover attorneys'
fees for the defense under Probate Code section 243. In the case of In re
Estate of Wilcox,141 a mother's will named certain of her children as bene-
ficiaries and executors. One of the children (Mary) sued her siblings, al-
leging a variety of misdeeds. One of the defendant brothers (Peter), who
was not serving as an executor, filed a motion seeking a summary judg-
ment. After winning the summary-judgment action, Peter obtained an
order granting him attorneys' fees under Probate Code section 243. Mary
appealed.
The Beaumont Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Probate Code
section 243 did not give the court the power to award Peter his attorneys'
fees. 1 42 Peter was not attempting to have his mother's will admitted to
probate or defending the validity of the will. Instead, Peter was defend-
ing himself against Mary's assertions of personal wrongdoing.
7. To Attorney Who is Also the Executor
In the case of In re Estate of Stanton,14 3 the probate court denied a
temporary administrator's request for attorneys' fees because it could not
distinguish the fees for work he performed as a temporary administrator
from the legal fees for his services, some of which were for services not
authorized by the probate court. However, the probate court indicated
that the temporary administrator could refile his application. The Tyler
Court of Appeals determined that the probate court's refusal was justi-
fied, and that the temporary administrator still had the possibility of re-
covering a portion of the requested fees upon making an appropriate
application.144
L. DETERMINATION OF HEIRSHIP-ATHORITY
OF ATTORNEY AD LITEM
The attorney ad litem for unknown heirs may take all actions for the
unknown clients as the attorney ad litem could take for actual known
clients. For example, in the case of In re Estate of Stanton,145 the duly
appointed attorney ad litem for the decedent's unknown heirs under Pro-
bate Court section 34A opposed various applications and asked the court
to appoint an independent party as the administrator. The probate court
agreed and appointed a third party as the administrator. The temporary
administrator appealed.
The court of appeals explained that the attorney ad litem had standing
to oppose the applications and request the appointment of an indepen-
141. 193 S.W.3d 701 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, no pet.).
142. Id. at 704.
143. 202 S.W.3d 205 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2005, pet. denied).
144. Id. at 209-10.
145. Id. at 208.
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dent third-party administrator. 1 46 The attorney ad litem owes the same
duty to the unknown heirs as he would owe to clients who expressly em-
ploy him. If the unknown heirs had been present, they could have op-
posed the applications and requested the appointment of an independent
third-party administrator, thus the attorney ad litem had both the stand-




Courts are reluctant to transform non-trust relationships into trust rela-
tionships. For example, in Jones v. Blum,148 several attorneys entered
into a fee-sharing agreement and, after a settlement was reached, litigated
the amounts to which each was entitled. One of the attorneys claimed
that a trust relationship existed between himself and one of the other
attorneys. Both the trial and appellate courts rejected this claim.149 The
Dallas Court of Appeals explained that the record contained no evidence
that the parties intended to create a trust with respect to the settlement
proceeds, and without trust intent, no trust exists under Trust Code sec-
tion 112.002.150
B. BENEFICIARIES
In re Weekley Homes, L.P.15 1 shows that arbitration clauses contained
in contracts signed by the trustee may impact beneficiaries' rights. The
settlor signed a contract for the purchase of a home that contained an
arbitration clause. After closing, the settlor transferred the house to a
previously existing revocable inter vivos trust for the benefit of his daugh-
ter. The settlor and his daughter were co-trustees of this trust. The set-
tlor explained that the only reason that he signed the purchase contract
individually was that he had forgotten to place the home into the trust.
Problems later arose with the house. The settlor, his daughter, and the
trust sued the builder, who then moved to compel arbitration. The lower
court compelled the settlor and the trust to arbitrate but not the daughter
under the theory that she was not bound by the arbitration clause be-
cause she did not sign the contract.152
The Supreme Court of Texas decided that the daughter was bound.1 53
Included in its discussion of the arbitration issue, the supreme court ex-
plained that "a suit involving a trust generally must be brought by or
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 196 S.W.3d 440 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied).
149. Id. at 448.
150. Id.
151. 180 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. 2005).
152. Id. at 129-30.
153. Id. at 135.
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against the trustee, and can be binding on the beneficiaries whether they
join it or not."'154 Even though the daughter did not purport to sue either
as a trustee or as a beneficiary of the trust, she was in reality both. Thus,
any recovery will directly benefit her as the sole beneficiary of the trust.
The supreme court noted that "if a trustee's agreement to arbitrate can
be avoided by simply having the beneficiaries bring suit, 'the strong state
policy favoring arbitration would be effectively thwarted.'" 55
IV. OTHER ESTATE-PLANNING MATTERS
A. MALPRACTICE
1. The Belt Opinion
In Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc.,15 6 the executors
sued the attorneys who prepared the testator's will, asserting that the at-
torneys provided negligent advice and drafting services. The executors
believed that the testator's estate incurred over $1.5 million in unneces-
sary federal estate taxes because of the malpractice. Both the trial and
court of appeals agreed that the executors had no standing to pursue the
claim because of lack of privity. 157 The appellate court explained that
privity was mandated by Barcelo v. Elliott, thus the appellate court had
no choice but to affirm the trial court's grant of a summary judgment in
favor of the attorneys.' 5 8
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed and held, "there is no legal bar
preventing an estate's personal representative from maintaining a legal
malpractice claim on behalf of the estate against the decedent's estate
planners." 159 The supreme court did not express an opinion as to
whether the attorney's conduct actually amounted to malpractice.
Here are the key points that the supreme court made:
- Barcelo remains good law. The supreme court did not overturrr
Barcelo. The supreme court explained that an attorney owes no duty
to a non-client, such as a will beneficiary or an intended will benefici-
ary, even if the individual is damaged by the attorney's malprac-
tice.160 The supreme court reiterated the policy considerations
supporting Barcelo:
[T]he threat of suits by disappointed heirs after a client's death
could create conflicts during the estate-planning process and di-
vide the attorney's loyalty between the client and potential benefi-
ciaries, generally compromising the quality of the attorney's
representation . . . . [S]uits brought by bickering beneficiaries
154. Id. at 133-34.
155. Id. (quoting Merrill Lynch v. Eddings, 838 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Tex. App.-Waco
1992, writ denied)).
156. 192 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. 2006).
157. Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 141 S.W.3d 706, 706 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2004), rev'd, 192 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. 2006).
158. Id. at 708-09 (citing Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996)).
159. Belt, 192 S.W.3d at 782.
160. Id. at 783.
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would necessarily require extrinsic evidence to prove how a dece-
dent intended to distribute the estate, creating a "host of difficul-
ties." . . . [B]arring a cause of action for estate-planning
malpractice by beneficiaries would help ensure that estate plan-
ners "zealously represent[ed]" their clients.16'
* Policies are different regarding suits by personal representatives.
The policy considerations discussed above do not apply to suits by
personal representatives. 162 The supreme court explained that, un-
like cases in which "disappointed heirs seek to dispute the size of
their bequest or their omission from an estate plan," these policy
considerations do not apply "when an estate's personal representa-
tive seeks to recover damages incurred by the estate itself. ' 163 The
supreme court also pointed out that "while the interests of the dece-
dent and a potential beneficiary may conflict, a decedent's interests
should mirror those of his estate.' 64 The supreme court wrapped up
its opinion by concluding that "[l]imiting estate-planning malpractice
suits to those brought by either the client or the client's personal
representative strikes the appropriate balance between providing ac-
countability for attorney negligence and protecting the sanctity of
the attorney-client relationship."' 165
* Possible "recasting" is possible. The supreme court recognized
the problem that may arise because a beneficiary is often appointed
as the estate's personal representative. The supreme court's holding
creates "an opportunity for some disappointed beneficiaries to recast
a malpractice claim for their own 'lost' inheritance, which would be
barred by Barcelo, as a claim brought on behalf of the estate." 66
The supreme court minimized this possibility by stating that "[t]he
temptation to bring such claims will likely be tempered, however, by
the fact that a personal representative who mismanages the perform-
ance of his or her duties may be removed from the position."'1 67 The
supreme court also pointed out that any recovery goes to the estate,
not the beneficiary, unless recovery flows through to the beneficiary
under the terms of the will.' 68
* The decedent's personal representative has capacity and standing.
The supreme court explained that it is well-accepted law that a dece-
dent's personal representative has the capacity to bring a survival
action on behalf of the decedent's estate. 169 The supreme court then
addressed an issue of first impression in Texas; that is, does a legal
malpractice claim in the estate-planning context survive a deceased
client? The supreme court explained that the common law allows
survival of actions for acts affecting property rights and that estate-
planning negligence that results in "the improper depletion of a cli-
161. Id.
162. See id. at 788.
163. Id. at 787.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 789.
166. Id. at 788.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 784.
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ent's estate involves injury to the decedent's property.' 170 Thus, the
supreme court held that "legal malpractice claims alleging pure eco-
nomic loss survive in favor of a deceased client's estate."17' Conse-
quently, the executors had standing to bring the malpractice claim.
e A malpractice claim accrues during the decedent's lifetime. The
supreme court explained that the alleged malpractice occurred dur-
ing the testator's lifetime even though the alleged damage (increased
estate-tax liability) did not occur until after the decedent's death.172
Thus, the supreme court disapproved a contrary holding in the lower
court case of Estate of Arlitt v. Paterson.173 The supreme court
pointed out that the testator could have brought the claim himself if
he had discovered the malpractice before his death and recovered his
attorney's fees and the costs incurred to restructure his estate
plan.174
- Discovery rule applies running of statute of limitations. In a foot-
note, the supreme court addressed the issue of when the statute of
limitations begins to run. The supreme court stated:
[W]hile an injury occurred during the decedent's lifetime for pur-
poses of determining survival, the statute of limitations for such a
malpractice action does not begin to run until the claimant "dis-
covers or should have discovered through the exercise of reasona-
ble care and diligence the facts establishing the elements of [the]
cause of action." . . . In this case, the "claimant" may be either the
decedent or the personal representative of the decedent's
estate. 175
Accordingly, estate planners are subject to potential malpractice ac-
tions brought by the personal representative of their client's estate.
Whether a practitioner may achieve protection from this liability is prob-
lematic. For example, must an estate planner review a detailed check-list
of all estate-planning strategies (if such a list can be created) with each
client and have the client affirmatively indicate that he or she under-
stands the potential benefits of each technique but does not wish to use
it?
2. Belt "Always" Texas Law?
O'Donnell v. Smith 176 examined whether an estate's personal repre-
sentative could sue the decedent's former attorneys for malpractice in ad-
vising the decedent in his capacity as the executor of his wife's estate.
The lower court ruled in favor of the attorneys, basing its judgment on
the fact that the decedent's executor and the estate lacked privity of con-
170. Id.
171. Id. at 785.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 785-86 (citing Estate of Arlitt v. Paterson, 995 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Tex. App.--
San Antonio 1999, pet. denied)).
174. Id. at 786.
175. Id. at 786 n.5 (quoting Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 121 (Tex. 2001)).
176. 197 S.W.3d 394 (Tex. 2006).
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tract with the attorneys. 177
The Supreme Court of Texas granted a petition for review without ref-
erence to the merits, vacated the lower court's judgment, and remanded
so that the lower court could take into account the holding in Belt.178
It seems that the Texas Supreme Court is willing to apply the Belt hold-
ing retroactively to causes of action that accrued and decisions rendered
before the date of the supreme court's decision. Accordingly, the su-
preme court appears to be saying that Belt is a statement of the way that
the law is and has always been, rather than a declaration of a new legal
rule.
B. FEDERAL PROBATE EXCEPTION
The United States Supreme Court clarified the extent of the "probate
exception" to federal jurisdiction in Marshall v. Marshall179 by allowing a
claim for tortious interference with an expectancy to go forward in fed-
eral court. The Court explained:
[T]he Ninth Circuit . . . read the probate exception broadly to ex-
clude from the federal courts' adjudicatory authority "not only direct
challenges to a will or trust, but also questions which would ordina-
rily be decided by a probate court in determining the validity of the
decedent's estate planning instrument." . . . The Court of Appeals
further held that a State's vesting of exclusive jurisdiction over pro-
bate matters in a special court strips federal courts of jurisdiction to
entertain any "probate related matter," including claims respecting
"tax liability, debt, gift, [or] tort.' 80
The Court then reversed, holding that "the Ninth Circuit had no war-
rant from Congress, or from decisions of this Court, for its sweeping ex-
tension of the probate exception."' 81
C. Gi-rs
As Decker v. Decker182 shows, an appellant will have a difficult time
setting aside a jury verdict that a transfer was due to undue influence or
made while the donor lacked capacity. In Decker, the son and daughter-
in-law moved in with the son's father to care for him. The father made
several inter vivos transfers of real property and a motor home to his son.
After the son's death, his father was successful in setting aside the inter
vivos transfers on the grounds that he was unduly influenced and that he
lacked the mental capacity to make the transfers. The daughter-in-law
appealed.
177. Id. at 394.
178. Id.
179. 126 S. Ct. 1735 (2006).
180. Id. at 1741 (quoting In re Estate of Marshall, 392 F.3d 1118, 1136 (9th Cir. 2004)).
181. Id.
182. 192 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).
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The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed. 183 The court engaged in a
careful review of the evidence and determined that it was sufficient to
support the jury's determination that the father was unduly influenced
and lacked the mental capacity to transfer the real property. 184 Accord-
ingly, the father still owns the real property.
With regard to the motor home, the situation was a bit more complex
because the daughter-in-law had already sold the motor home to her un-
cle, and the trial court's judgment did not award the motor home to ei-
ther the daughter-in-law or the father. The court found that the evidence
was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the father was unduly in-
fluenced to transfer the motor home, thus the transaction should be set
aside. 185 The uncle did not obtain a finding that he was a bona fide pur-
chaser, thus the motor home still belongs to the father. 186
D. FROZEN EMBRYO DISPOSITION UPON DIVORCE
Individuals contemplating assisted reproduction must carefully antici-
pate the impact of changed circumstances such as divorce. For example,
in Roman v. Roman,'8 7 a husband and his wife underwent medical proce-
dures that resulted in three embryos that were frozen for later implanta-
tion. In writing, they agreed to discard the embryos if they divorced.
When a divorce action ensued, however, the wife was successful in ob-
taining a court order permitting her to take possession of and use the
embryos. The trial court explained that the embryos were community
property and that awarding them to the wife was "just and right and a fair
and equitable division" of the property. 88 The husband appealed.
In this case of first impression in Texas, the Houston Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the agreement to discard the embryos upon di-
vorce was binding on the parties. 189 The court conducted an extensive
review of cases from other jurisdictions that have addressed the validity
and enforceability of this type of agreement. The court also studied the
Texas statutes governing assisted reproduction and recognized that
"[n]oticeably absent from [the statutes] is any legislative directive on how
to determine the disposition of the embryos in case of a contingency such
as death or divorce."' 190 The court also determined that case law con-
tained nothing "incompatible with the recognition of the parties' agree-
ment as controlling.' 191 Accordingly, the court concluded that "the
public policy of [Texas] would permit a husband and wife to enter volun-
tarily into an agreement, before implantation, that would provide for an
183. Id. at 658.
184. Id. at 656.
185. Id. at 657.
186. Id. at 658.
187. 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. filed).
188. Id. at 43.
189. Id. at 54-55.




embryo's disposition in the event of a contingency, such as divorce." 192
The court then analyzed the agreement and determined that it was an
enforceable contract because it "manifests a voluntary unchanged mutual
intention of the parties regarding disposition of the embryos upon
divorce. '193
E. MARRIAGE-LIKE RELATIONSHIP DOCTRINE
Texas does not recognize the marriage-like relationship doctrine, thus
unmarried partners must use other legal techniques to achieve their es-
tate-planning desires. For example, in Ross v. Goldstein,194 as the inde-
pendent administrator of his father's estate, a son brought suit against his
father's partner to recover estate assets. The partner claimed that he was
entitled to the assets under the marriage-like relationship doctrine. Both
the trial and Houston Court of Appeals rejected the partner's claim and
refused to recognize this doctrine. The partner asserted that the doctrine
is an equitable remedy that is not against the public policy of Texas, and
would "aid the courts in addressing the growing reality of same-sex rela-
tionships."'1 95 The court of appeals explained that it was unwilling to rec-
ognize the marriage-like relationship doctrine, and that "same-sex
couples must address their particular desires through other legal vehicles
such as contracts or testamentary transfers. '196
The court examined two provisions of Texas law-first, article 1, sec-
tion 32 of the Texas Constitution, which provides that no state or political
subdivision may create or recognize any legal status identical or similar to
marriage for same-sex partners, and, second, Texas Family Code section
6.204, which states that it is contrary to Texas public policy to recognize
or give effect to a same-sex marriage or civil union. 197 Accordingly, the
court held that it lacked the power to create an equitable remedy akin to
marriage.198
192. Id. at 49-50.
193. Id. at 50, 54-55.
194. 203 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
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